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FULL FAITH AND CREDIT
seven, years of age are conclusively presumed incapable of
contributory negligence.2
It therefore appears that Miller v. Graff,2" has in effect
reversed the line of earlier Maryland cases and has moved
this jurisdiction away from its former very extreme posi-
tion to one more in conformity with the opinions of other
states.
As a practical matter this new holding will not make
much difference. The former rule allowed the jury to con-
sider whether a Plaintiff of four years or less was guilty of
contributory negligence. Since the standard of reasonable
care for such infants is such a slight one, it is most likely
that juries would find the standard had been met by an in-
jured child, while the Court of Appeals could hardly say
that it had not been met as a matter of law. Thus the result
produced by the new rule will in most cases be the same as
that under the old one, except that it removes the possibility
of a verdict for the Defendant in an extremely flagrant case.
STATE LAW v. FULL FAITH AND CREDIT
Hughes v. Fetter'
First National Bank v. United Air Lines2
Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Company'
When a State adopts a rule of conflict of laws, the rule is
necessarily subject to the restrictions of the Federal Con-
stitution. One such restriction, the Full Faith and Credit
Clause,4 is broad in scope and has required frequent clarifi-
cation by the United States Supreme Court. Full faith and
credit isn't necessarily an inflexible blade for shearing the
sovereignty of a State in diversity situations. Under some
circumstances it contemplates room for the reasonable play
of public policy. According to the facts of each case, the
Supreme Court must decide whether or not the forum has
met the minimum Constitutional requirements in applying
a particular conflict of laws rule. Two aspects of the prob-
107 A. L. R. 4, 71, 174 A. L. R. 1080, 1103.
Supra, n. 1.
1341 U. S. 609 (1951). A 5 to 4 decision.
2342 U. S. 396 (1952).
8345 U. S. 514 (1953).
4 "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts,
Records, and judicial proceedings of every other State."
U. S. Const., Art. IV, Sec. 1, Ci. 1.
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lem are presented in the cases that follow. The first two
cases pertain to the attempts of States to limit jurisdiction
as to certain causes of action arising outside the State. The
third case concerns the application of statutes of limitation
as to causes of action arising outside the forum State.
HUGHES V. FEhrr 5
Harold Hughes was fatally injured in an automobile
accident in Illinois. The administrator brought an action
against the allegedly negligent driver and an insurance com-
pany in a state court in Wisconsin, basing the complaint on
the Illinois wrongful death statute.6 The trial court dis-
missed the complaint, holding that the Wisconsin death
statute7 which created a right of action only for deaths
caused in Wisconsin established a public policy against
entertaining actions brought under the wrongful death
statutes of other states. The Wisconsin Supreme Court
affirmed the action of the trial court despite the contention
that such a construction of the Wisconsin statute was a vio-
lation of the Federal Constitution under the Full Faith and
Credit Clause. The Supreme Court of the United States
granted certiorari to hear the Constitutional question in-
volved.
In describing the conflict the Court said:
"... On the one hand is the strong unifying principle
embodied in the Full Faith and Credit Clause looking
toward maximum enforcement in each state of the
obligations or rights created or recognized by the stat-
utes of sister states; on the other hand is the policy of
Wisconsin, as interpreted by its highest court, against
permitting Wisconsin courts to entertain this wrongful
death action."8
In examining the facts in order to determine what weight
to give the Wisconsin public policy, the Court stated that
Wisconsin:
"... has no real feeling of antagonism against wrong-
ful death suits in general. To the contrary, a forum is
regularly provided for cases of this nature, the exclu-
sionary rule extending only so far as to bar actions for
5 Supra, n. 1.
6Smith-Hurd's Ill. Ann. Stat. (1936), Ch. 70, Sees. 1, 2, now Ill. Rev.
Stat. (1953), Ch. 70, Sees. 1, 2.
7Wis. Stat. (1949), Sec. 331.03, now Wis. Stat. (1951), Sec. 331.03, con-
tains language generally used in wrongful death acts, but concludes, "...
provided, that such action shall be brought for a death caused in this state."
I Supra, n. 1, 612.
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death not caused locally. The Wisconsin policy, more-
over, cannot be considered as an application of the
forum non conveniens doctrine, whatever effect that
doctrine might be given if its use resulted in denying
enforcement to public acts of other states. Even if we
assume that Wisconsin could refuse, by reason of par-
ticular circumstances, to hear foreign controversies to
which nonresidents were parties, the present case is
not one lacking a close relationship with the state. For
not only were appellant, the decedent and the indi-
vidual defendant all residents of Wisconsin, but also
appellant was appointed administrator and the cor-
porate defendant was created under Wisconsin laws."'
The court did not permit Wisconsin to exercise its public
policy in such a way as to escape its Constitutional obliga-
tion to enforce rights created under the laws of other States
by the device of removing jurisdiction from its courts. In
remanding the cause to the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, the
Court concluded that ". . . Under these circumstances ..."
the Full Faith and Credit Clause forbade the Wisconsin
statutory policy ".... which excludes this Illinois cause of
action.. ."10 The wording could be construed to imply that
under other circumstances the construction placed upon
the Wisconsin wrongful death statute by the Wisconsin
courts might not be in contravention of the Full Faith and
Credit Clause.
A strong dissent objected to the imposition of a "state of
vassalage" on the forum. In distinguishing the extent to
which the courts of a State are required to respect judgments
entered by courts of other States" from the extent to which
a State may give play to its own public policy in refusing
to enforce the rights of action created by other States, 2 the
dissent conceded that in the field of commercial law "where
certainty is of high importance" the Court had "imposed a
rather rigid rule" that the forum defer to the law of "the
State of incorporation, or to the law of the place of con-
tract"." But in a tort situation such as the present case,
" Ibid.
10 Ibid, 613. Italics supplied.
n Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U. S. 230 (1908) ; Kenney v. Supreme Lodge, 252
U. S. 411 (1920) ; Milwaukee County v. White Co., 296 U. S. 268 (1935).
12Alaska Packers Assn. v. Commission, 294 U. S. 532 (1935) ; Pacific Insur-
ance Co. v. Commission, 306 U. S. 493 (1939) ; and, of. Bradford Electric
Co. v. Clapper, 286 U. S. 145 (1932).
8 Supra, n. 1, dis. op. 614, 615, citing Converse v. Hamilton, 224 U. S. 243
(1912) ; Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U. S. 629 (1935) ; John Hancock Insurance
Co. v. Yates, 299 U. S. 178 (1936). Cf. Goonmic-, CONFLICT Or LAWS (3rd
Ed., 1949), p. 609, n. 22.
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where ability of parties to predict consequences in advance
plays no part (as it would in commercial transactions) the
dissent considered the action of the Court as an unwar-
ranted interference in the domestic affairs of the States,
and stated:
"This vital interest of the States should not be sacri-
ficed in the interest of a merely literal reading of the
"114Full Faith and Credit Clause....
FIRST NATIONAL BANK V. UNITED AIR LINEs' 5
In a subsequent case, First National Bank v. United Air
Lines, the facts were similar to those in Hughes v. Fetter'6
with two exceptions: 1. The statute of the forum state per-
mitted an action under the wrongful death statute (if any)
of the State in which the death occurred, provided service
of process could not be had on defendant in that State.
2. The action was brought initially in a federal court of
the forum state rather than in a state court. The Court
stated that it was not crucial that the forum excluded only
cases that could be tried in other states, and basing its de-
cision squarely on Hughes v. Fetter held the death statute
of the forum (Illinois) invalid under the Full Faith and
Credit Clause and reversed the dismissal of the case by the
District Court. In so doing the Court necessarily followed
the pattern criticized by Mr. Justice Jackson in his con-
curring opinion,"7 in which he said :
"The Court's detour follows this itinerary: the fed-
eral court is bound by the law of Illinois; Illinois law is
wrong; we will remake the law of Illinois to provide
the exact opposite to that which the state has provided;
then the federal court can apply the law we have re-
made and pretend it is applying Illinois law."'"
Having unlocked the door with a very carefully worded
opinion in Hughes v. Fetter,9 the Court threw it wide open
with the First National Bank v. United Air Lines. 20 The
latter case contained none of the cautious language of its
predecessor. Whereas the opinion in the earlier case was
worded so as to imply that the holding was limited to the
u Supra, n. 1, dis. op. 614, 620.
Supra, n. 2.
"Supra, -n. 1.
Supra, n. 2,342 U. S. 396, conc. op. 398 (1952).
Ibid, 401.
19 Supra, ns. 1, 5.
Supra, ns. 2, 15.
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particular circumstances involved, the Court in the later
case apparently chose to interpret it as a green light for the
invalidation of all such exclusionary devices in wrongful
death statutes.
Under the combined effect of Hughes v. Fetter and First
National Bank v. United Air Lines, Sec. 3 (c), Art. 67 of the
Maryland Code might well be held invalid as contravening
the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Sec. 3 of Art. 67 provides:
"In all actions instituted in the courts of this State
under Section 2 of this Article, the proper person to
bring the action shall be determined by applying the
following rules:
(a) Any person who is entitled to bring suit under
the laws of the jurisdiction wherein the wrongful death
occurred may bring suit in Maryland, under proof of his
qualifications and authority.
(b) If the laws of the State wherein the wrongful
death occurred provide for suit to be brought in the
name of the State, District or Territory, as the case may
be, then suit may be brought in Maryland in the name
of this State on behalf of the beneficiaries protected
under the foreign statute.
(c) The provisions of this section shall not in any
way be construed to apply to actions in which service
of process can be obtained in the jurisdiction where the
cause of action arose or where the plaintiff resides."
Whether this provision of said Section 3 (c) applies back
to Section 2 so as to defeat foreign death claims thought to
be fully protected in Maryland by Code Article 67, Sec. 2,21
or is restricted only to the problem of who may bring
the suit, it is an exclusionary device which is necessarily
suspect under these recent cases, particularly the First
National Bank case.22 The possibility of its being upheld,
would seem to rest only in a change of position by the
Supreme Court, which cannot be left out of consideration
in view of the sharp division of views expressed in Hughes
v. Fetter. As stated, that case was a 5-4 decision, argued
principally upon the question of the State's right to exer-
cise its public policy under Full Faith and Credit. The dis-
=Rose v. Phillips Packing Co., 21 F. Supp. 485 (D. C. Md., 1937), noted,
2 Md. L. Rev. 168 (1938), particularly at p. 172, circa, n. 18. See Comment
9 Md. L. Rev. 263 (1948).
Supra, ns. 2, 15; Ibid, 9 Md. L. Rev. 265.
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sent had a persuasive argument for permitting the State
greater flexibility in the exercise of its state policies. The
background of the new Chief Justice might indicate a view-
point in line with the dissenting opinion, making the over-
ruling of Hughes v. Fetter a reasonable possibility. If
Hughes v. Fetter is ever overruled, it is likely that the First
National Bank case would fall with it. In a situation such
as the First National Bank case with a federal rather than
a state setting, the majority of the Justices would be bound
by Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Co.,23 to follow the State conflicts
rule. With Hughes v. Fetter overruled, the federal courts
would follow what would then be a valid exclusionary
clause in the Maryland wrongful death statute.
However, if Hughes v. Fetter remains the law, the public
policy of the State must give way to full faith and credit
when the question arises as to whether a State will enter-
tain an action for a wrongful death occurring in a sister
State.24
WELLS V. SnvmioDs ABRAsIVE CoMPANY 25
This case raised the question of whether in an action
arising under the statutes of another State, the Full Faith
and Credit Clause requires the forum to apply a specific
period of limitation written into the statute of the State of
injury? It has long been settled that the application of the
general statute of limitations of the forum to a common law
cause of action arising in a foreign jurisdiction is not a
denial of full faith and credit.2 6 But, the decisions of the
courts of the various States show little uniformity as to
whether the special limitation period provided in connec-
tion with a statutory-created right is to be considered as
part of the right and to be applied as substantive law, or
whether the built-in limitation should be treated as pro-
cedural and the forum permitted to apply its own limitation
period in the same way as a general limitation is applied.27
Many states have passed borrowing statutes, the general
effect of which is to give to one sued the benefit of a bar
completed elsewhere. Even without borrowing statutes
-313 U. S. 487 (1941) ; noted in 6 Md. L. Rev. 160 (1942).
This situation is distinguished from the situation in which the forum
entertains the action, but incorrectly applies its own law rather than the
law of its sister State. The Court in Hughes v. Fetter recognizes the dis-
tinction, but gives no opinion.
Supra, n. 3.
21 McElmoyle v. Cohen, 13 Pet. 312 (U. S. 1839) ; Townsend v. Jemison,
9 How. 407 (U. S. 1850) ; Wright v. New York Underwriters' Ins. Co., 1 F.
Supp. 663 (D. C. Mo. 1932).
See GOoDRiC, CONFLICT OF LAWS (3rd Ed., 1949), Sec. 86.
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some courts have applied the limitations of a sister State
where to do so would cut down the time for bringing the
action considering the foreign limitation as an additional
bar to the limitations of the forum.2" Courts have been
more reluctant to apply the foreign limitation when to do
so would extend the forum's usual limitation.29
In the Wells case, Wells was killed in Alabama when a
grinding wheel with which he was working burst. The
wheel had been manufactured by the Simonds Abrasive
Company, a corporation with its principal place of business
in Pennsylvania. Roberta Wells, widow and administratrix
of decedent, brought an action for damages in the federal
court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania against the
Simonds Abrasive Company, having predicated her action
upon the section of the Alabama Code3 1 which permits the
personal representative to bring an action for injuries caus-
ing the death of the decedent ". . . within two years from
and after the death.... ." The Pennsylvania wrongful death
statute required suit to be commenced within one year.
3 1
The plaintiff brought the action after one year, but within
two years, after the death. The District Court ordered sum-
mary judgment for the defendant, stating:32
".... the action being a diversity suit, this Court is
bound to apply the conflict of laws rule of the State of
Pennsylvania and by that rule the limitation of the
Alabama statute has no controlling effect. .. ."
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the
judgment of the District Court.33 The Supreme Court of
the United States granted certiorari to determine whether
or not the Pennsylvania conflicts rule violated the Full Faith
and Credit Clause of the Federal Constitution.
The Supreme Court assumed, as did the District Court,
that the federal court sitting in Pennsylvania would follow
the Pennsylvania conflicts rule, evidently considering as
settled a rule laid down in Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Co., 4
namely, that in diversity suits the federal court sitting in
the forum state would apply the conflict of laws rules of
2 The Harrisburg, 119 U. S. 199 (1886) ; Davis v. Mills, 194 U. S. 451
(1904) ; Dunn Const. Co. v. Bourne, 172 Miss. 620, 159 So. 841 (1935).
1Rosenzweig v. Heller, 302 Pa. 279, 153 A. 346 (1931) ; Platt v. Wilmot,
193 U. S. 602 (1904).
0 Ala. Code (1940), Tit. 7, Sec. 123.
9 Purdon's Pa. Stat. Ann. (1931), Tit. 12, Sec. 1603; now 1936 edition.
Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 102 F. Supp. 519, 520 (E. D. Pa., 1951).
DWells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 195 F. 2d 814 (3rd Cir., 1952).
Supra, n. 23.
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the forum state. The Court's only concern was the Consti-
tutionality of the Pennsylvania conflicts rule.
In its opinion the Supreme Court said:
"The states are free to adopt such rules of conflict
of laws as they choose, Kryger v. Wilson, 242 U. S. 171
(1916), subject to the Full Faith and Credit Clause and
other constitutional restrictions. The Full Faith and
Credit Clause does not compel a state to adopt any
particular set of rules of conflict of laws; it merely sets
certain minimum requirements which each state must
observe when asked to apply the law of a sister state." 5
Having stated that full faith and credit required only
that the States meet certain minimum requirements, the
Court said that the application of the statute of limitations
of the forum to a foreign substantive right was not a denial
of full faith and credit.36 The Court recognized that there
were divergent views when the limitation involved was in-
cluded in the section of a statute creating a right unknown
to the common law.37 Such a built-in limitation in some
jurisdictions is held to be so intimately connected with the
right that it must be enforced in the forum state along with
the substantive right. A similar built-in limitation was in-
cluded in the Alabama wrongful death statute under which
this action was brought s.3  The Supreme Court said:
"We are not concerned with the reasons which have
led some states for their own purposes to adopt the
foreign limitation, instead of their own, in such a situa-
tion. The question here is whether the Full Faith and
Credit Clause compels them to do so. Our prevailing
rule is that the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not
compel the forum state to use the period of limitation
of a foreign state. We see no reason in the present
situation to graft an exception onto it. Differences
based upon whether the foreign right was known to
the common law or upon the arrangement of the code
of the foreign state are too unsubstantial to form the
basis for constitutional distinctions under the Full Faith
and Credit Clause."'89
*345 U. S. 514, 516 (1953).
, MeElmoyle v. Cohen, 8upra, n. 26; Townsend v. Jemison, 8upra, n. 26;
Bacon v. Howard, 20 How. 22 (U. S. 1857).
"Supra, n. 27.
Supra, n. 30.
Supra, n. 35, 517.
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The Court distinguishes this decision from the decisions
in Hughes v. Fetter" and First National Bank v. United Air
Lines,41 reasoning that in the latter cases the forum laid
an uneven hand on causes of action that arose within and
without the forum state, but that in this case the forum
applies the one-year limitation to all wrongful death actions
wherever they may arise.
Having thus upheld the constitutionality of the Penn-
sylvania conflicts rule, the Supreme Court affirmed the
judgment of the District Court that had followed the rule.
Three members of the Court, in an opinion written by
Justice Jackson, dissented from the result reached in the
majority opinion. Whereas the majority of the Justices felt
that the difference between general limitations and built-in
limitations was too unsubstantial to form the basis of a
constitutional distinction under the Full Faith and Credit
Clause, the dissenting Justices felt that such a distinction
could and should be made by the federal courts. The dissent
pointed out that where the foreign limitation operated as a
bar to an action in the forum, it was readily enough applied.
In The Harrisburg,2 an early case cited in the dissenting
opinion, Chief Justice Waite had written for a unanimous
court:
"The time within which the suit must be brought
operates as a limitation of the liability itself as created,
and not of the remedy alone .... The liability and the
remedy are created by the same statutes, and the limi-
tations of the remedy are, therefore, to be treated as
limitations of the right."
Two subsequent cases, Davis v. Mills" and Atlantic Coast
Line Railroad Co. v. Burnette44 are cited to the same effect.
Having established authority for the doctrine that the
remedy is inseparable from the right, the dissent stated that
".... the validity of a doctrine does not depend on whose
ox it gores.. .", and reasoned that since the Supreme Court
of Alabama had held45 the time limit"'... not a statute of
limitations, but of the essence of the cause of action... ,
full faith and credit should require the federal courts to
apply the built-in limitation the same way.
10 Supra, ns. 1, 5.
41 Supra, ns. 2, 15.
4'2 Supra, n. 28, 214.
48 Supra, n. 28, 454.
"239 U. S. 199, 201 (1915).
0 Parker v. Fies & Sons, 243 Ala. 348, 10 So. 2d 13, 15 (1942).
" 345 U. S. 514, dis. op. 519, 525, 526.
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In its comments the dissent aimed not so much at
whether full faith and credit required state courts to apply
the built-in limitation of the lex loci delicti, but more at
whether or not the federal courts should be so required.
This stand necessitated an assault on the Klaxon v. Stentor 7
rule that is interpreted as requiring the federal courts to
follow the conflict of laws rules of the states in which they
are sitting. The Klaxon case, decided by a unanimous court
and not seriously challenged until this time, was attacked
as a misapplication of the Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins"
principles, and further isolated by the dissent as being dicta
in its application to cases other than those involving con-
tracts.4" Both the majority and the dissent were apparently
in agreement as to the desirability of permitting the states
a reasonable exercise of public policy with respect to the
application of foreign limitations.
Despite the historical development of statutes of limita-
tion which has shown a broad tendency in recent years to
consider limitations as substantive, Wells v. Simonds Abra-
sive Co. indicates that a majority of the Supreme Court
law at present is otherwise. The Court stated that the appli-
cation of the statute of limitations of the forum to a foreign
substantive right was not a denial of full faith and credit,
regardless of whether the right was known to the common
law or created by a statute which purported to include a
substantive period of limitation.
With the Supreme Court thus holding that the forum
may apply its own limitation to shorten the period pre-
scribed by the lex loci delicti, question may be raised as to
whether the Court could similarly justify permitting the
forum to extend the period of a foreign built-in limitation
(in effect permitting an action on a right that no longer
exists).
"' Supra, n. 23.
68304 U. S. 64 (1938).
69 For a good discussion of whether or not Erie Railroad v. Tompkins prin-
ciples should be extended to conflict of laws cases, read COOK, THE LoGIcAL
AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLIor or LAws, (1942), Ch. V.
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